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Foreword

T

he historic International Law Studies ("Blue Book" ) series was initiated by
the Naval War College in 1901 to publish essays, treatises and articles that
contribute to the broader understanding of international law. This, the eightyeighth volume of the "Blue Book" series, is a compilation of scholarly papers and
remarks derived from the proceedings of a conference hosted at the Naval War
College on June 21-23, 20 11 entitled "Non-International Armed Conflict in the
21st Century."
The purpose of the June 20 11 International Law Conference was to examine
the legal issues surrounding non-international armed conflict (NlAC) in the
modern era. To this end, renowned international academics and legal advisers,
both military and civilian, representing military, diplomatic, non-governmental
and academic institutions from the global community, were invited to the War
College to analyze a variety oflegal topics related to NIAC. Specifically, the panelists undertook an examination of the types of NlACs and the law applicable to
each; the legal statuses of actors in NlAC; means and methods of warfare in
NIAC; recent and ongoing NIACs; detention in NIAC; and enforcement of international law in NlAC. In addition, the Honorable Harold H. Koh, Legal Adviser
of the U.S. Department of State, presented a luncheon address at the Naval Station Newport Officers' Club on the second day of the conference.
The distinguished panelists were invited to contribute articles to this volume to
furth er develop their thoughts offered at the conference, and this "Blue Book" is
largely comprised of these articles. Readers and researchers will find within this
volume a detailed study of the law pertaining to non-international armed conflicts
as it is interpreted and applied in the post-September 11 world, and its effect on
State actions, particularly military operations.
The conference and the "Blue Book" were made possible with generous support from the Naval War College Foundation, the Israel Yearbook on Human
Rights, the International Institute of Humanitarian Law, and the Lieber Society
on the Law of Armed Conflict, American Society ofInternational Law.
On behalf of the Secretary of the Navy, the Ch ief of Naval Operations and
the Co mmandant of the Marine Corps, I extend our thanks and gratitude to
all the participants, contributing authors and editors for their invaluable contributions to this project and to the future understanding of the law applicable in
non-international armed conflicts, the predominant form of warfare during the

The opinions shared in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions
of the U.S. Naval War College, the Dept. of the Navy, or Dept. of Defense.

last several decades and the type of conflicts in which military forces are most
likely to be engaged in the twenty-first century.

JOHN N. CHRlSTENSON
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College
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Introduction

D

uring the past half century, non-international armed conflicts have far
outnumbered those that are international in character. Indeed, as the conference that provided the basis for this volume was underway, the United States
was engaged with its NATO allies in a non-international armed conflict in Afghanistan and was winding down its long participation in one in Iraq. The nation was
also "at war" with various transnational terrorist groups in what many characterize
as non-international armed conflict.
Yet, the lex scripta governing international armed conflict dwarfs that addressing non-international armed conflict. Moreover, although international tribunals
have handled many cases involving the latter, their decisions often prove controversial, especially when applying the law of international armed conflict to nonin ternational conflicts. Unfortunately, even the academic community pays less
attention to the law of non-international armed conflict than merited by its legal
complexity and the frequency and human consequences of the conflicts to which
it applies.
This reality is unsurprising. International armed conflict self-evidently affects
international stability. As history has demonstrated time and again, the risks of
escalation and of spread are high whenever such conflicts occur. These and other
facto rs motivate the members of the international community to agree upon
norms limiting the effects of State-on-State conflict lest they find themselves involved therein. In doing so, States not only accept limitations on their battlefield
actions, but also secure protection for, j"fer alia, their civilians, civilian property
and soldiers lIors de combat. The key to the system is the reciprocity inherent in the
treaty and customary law regimes that encompass opposing belligerents. Since the
law of international anned conflict is more robust than its non-international counterpart, so too is the attention paid it.
Non-international armed conflict is of a fundamentally different nature. In
most cases, States are facing organized groups oflawbreakers from whom reciprocity cannot be expected. Therefore, there is often little incentive for States to limit
their scope of action by agreeing to legal norms with which only they will abide.
Moreover, as the conflict is "internal," the risk of spread is limited, while the in volvement of other States is a matter of their discretion.
However, the context in which non-international anned conflict occurs is undergoing transformation. Transnational terrorism has become a globally pervasive
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phenomenon, one that the international community seems increasingly willing to
classify as non-international, at least to the extent it rises to the level of "armed
conflict" as a matter oflaw. Further, as illustrated by the con flicts in the Balkans,
Afghanistan and the Great Lakes region of Africa, the likelihood of spillover into
neighboring countries is very real, especially when a conflict is ethnically or religiously based or when adjacent territory is poorly governed. And the rise of criminal groups with capabilities equaling those of government forces, as in Colombia
and Mexico, raises the question of whether the hostilities they engage in qualify as
armed conflict.
The International Law Department of the Naval War College, long noted for
exploring new legal challenges in its annual conferences, accordingly decided that
a closer examination of the law governing non -international armed conflict was
opportune. Held in June 201 1, the resulting conference brought together many of
the key legal practitioners and scholars in the field to consider both the state of the
law and where it might be headed. Certain of the participants were invited to
expand on their presentations in this volume, the eighty-eighth in the Naval War
College's International Law Studies ("Blue Books") series. It delves into such complicated topics as the scope of non-international armed conflict, the legal status of
actors, specific limitations on methods and means of warfare, detention and enforcement. The volume also offers several firsthand descriptions of particular
non-international armed conflicts. Hopefully, the various contributions will assist
those tasked with providing legal advice d uring fut ure non-international armed
conflicts, as well as make a measurable contrib ution to the scholarship on the
subject.
Appreciation is owed to many who made the conference and this volume of the
"Blue Books" possible. Rear Admiral John Christenson, President of the Naval
War College, and Ambassador Mary Ann Peters, its Provost, provide the leadership
that enables the International Law Department to undertake these cutting-edge
studies. Professor Robert "Barney" Rubel, Dean of the Center for Naval Warfa re
Studies, consistently affords the International Law Department the material support necessary to engage in meaningful research, as well as the vision that undergirds all of its activities. Professor Dennis Mandsager, fo rmer Chairman of the
International Law Department, was at the helm as the Department developed the
topic and executed the conference. Lieutenant Colonel George Cadwalader ably
selVed as Confere nce Director, an oft-thankless duty, but one that is the key to success. Finally, Brigadier General Kenneth Watkin, Canadian Forces (Ret.), the War
College's 20 11 - 12 Stockton Professor of International Law, and Captain Andrew
Norris, U.S. Coast Guard, edited this important volume with substantive aplomb
and editorial finesse. They are to be congratulated.
xiv
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The Naval War College has engaged in international law study and writing since
the late nineteenth century. Indeed, the first volwne of the "Blue Book" series was
authored in 1901 by Professor l ohn Bassett Moore, who would go on to serve as the
first U.S. judge on the Permanent Court of International Justice. It is our commitment to continue this proud tradition in the years to come.

PROFESSOR MICHAEL N. SCHMITI
Chairman, International Law Department
United States Naval War College
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Preface

F

rom June 21 to 23, 20 11, the U.S. Naval War CoUege hosted distinguished in-

ternational scholars and practitioners. both military and civilian, representing government and academic institutions, to participate in a conference
examining the evolving law in non-international armed conflict (NIAC) in the
twenty-first century. Panelists discussed their views on how the law will develop as

the world continues to struggle with the changing nature of the threats to national
and international security posed by failed and failing States, insurgencies. and
transnational criminal and terrorist organizations. The conference featured opening, luncheon and dosing addresses, as well as six panel discussions.
The conference swnmary that follows was prepared by Commander Christian
P. Fleming, JAGC, U.S. Navy, a member of the Navy Reserve unit that supports the
Naval War College's International Law Department. The summary recapitulates
the highlights of each conference speaker's presentation. As co-editors, we are
deeply indebted to Commander Fleming for his attention to detail and assistance
in facilitating the publication of this " Blue Book." We would also be remiss if we
did no t than k Captain Ralph Thomas, JAGC, U.S. Navy (Ret.), for his outstanding
support and dedication in editing the submissions for this volwne of the In ternational Law Studies series. We also extend our sincere ap preciation to Susan Meyer
ofthe Naval War College's Desktop Publishing Division for expertly preparing the
page proofs. Add itionally, we would like to thank Albert Fassbender and Shannon
Cole for their excellent work in proofreading the conference papers. The quality of
this volume is a retlection of their professionalism and outstanding expertise.
This " Blue Book" would not have come to fruition had it not been fo r the enormously successful conference made possible in large measure by the conference
committee under the leadership of Lieutenant Colonel George Cadwalader, U.S.
Marine Corps, working with Mrs. Jayne Van Petten of the International Law Department, and the support provided by the Naval War College Foundation, the International Institute ofH umanitarian Law, the Lieber Society on the Law of Armed
Conflict (American Society of International Law) and the Israel Yearbook on Human Rights. We thank these individuals and organizations for their end uring support and generosity.
We hope that the thought-p rovokingartides published in this " Blue Book" will
add to-and help shape-the debate on the multiple complex emerging legal issues presented by the changing character of war. The insights offered to legal

Preface
practitioners and scholars should assist them as they address these and other issues
that may evolve in future conflicts.

Opening Address
Professor Ken Watkin delivered the opening address. After introductory remarks,
Professor Watkin began his discussion of law in NlAC by quoting Colonel
Caldwell, who in 1906 defined a form ofNlAC known as "small wars" as being
"campaigns undertaken to suppress rebellion and guerilla warfare in all parts of
the world where organized armies are struggling against opponents who will not
meet them in the open field. " The 1940 Small Wars Manual of the U.S. Marine
Corps indicated that "small wars represent the normal and frequent operations of
the Marine Corps."
Because States have been hostile to clarifying the law, there has been limited success in articulating the law ofNIAC. The concern is that non-State actors will be
given legitimacy. Given the lack of consensus on what law applies to small war, a dialogue has been left open as to how and to what degree human rights law governs
the use of force, the treatment of detainees and the accountability process in
NIACs. Gaps remain and the law governing N1AC needs to be clarified for a number of reasons.
First, NlACs have been and will remain the dominant form of warfare. NlACs
will not disappear and pure international wars are becoming rare. International
armed conflicts (lACs) can change to NlACs overnight. This occurred in Afghanistan. Did troops on the ground notice the change? Did the legal advice change? As a
result, for most practitioners the key question to be asked is whether there is an
armed conflict rather than whether it is lAC or NlAC. Ironically, the Lieber Code,
written during the American Civil War, a NlAC, was a starting point for codifying
rules in an armed conflict. Unfortunately, the law applied in NIACs has become
muddier since then.
Second, the lack of clarity regarding the law ofNlAC can have a profound and
sometimes negative effect not only on the victims of conflict, but also on States in
terms of whether their actions are viewed as being legitimate. For example, in post9/11 detainee operations, the dialogue would have been much different jfthere had
been greater clarity in the law. An application of the policy oftreating captured personnel under prisoner of war standards, without providing that status, or as security detainees under Geneva Convention IV could have been a practical, defensible
and ultimately helpful approach. However, even today, an internationally agreedupon framework governing detainees in NIAC is lacking.
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Third, there is a belief that the law applicable to NlAC has no real relevance to
conflicts between States. However, there can be significant cross-poUination oflegal issues, such as when dealing with an insurgency during belligerent occupation.
Finally, the unwillingness of States to clarify what law applies to N IAC has negatively impacted their ability to influence how that law is being shaped. Gaps, both
real and perceived, are being filled by restatements and manuals of international
organizations instead of by States. One example is the International Committee of
the Red Cross's 20091nterpretive Guidance on the Norion of Direct Participation in
Hostilities, which deals with an issue that States appear to have been either unwilling or unable to address. The Guidance is representative of a trend suggesting that
States should be held to a higher standard than their non-State opponents. Adding
new inequity to the existing law is not likely to aid in reaching consensus among
such significant stakeholders in intemational law as States.
At the same time, States cannot complain about new manuals if they do not get
fully engaged in the processes being used to clarify the law. Civilians must be protected and the question is the degree to which States want to influence that process.

Panel I: Types ofNlACs and Applicable Law
Panel I, moderated by Commander James Kraska, JAGC, U.S. Navy, of the Naval
War College's International Law Department, consisted of Mr. David Graham of
the US. Army's Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School, Professor
Geoffrey Corn of South Texas College of Law, Professor Charles Garraway of the
Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) and Mr. Karl Chang of
the U.S. Department of Defense Office of General Counsel.
Mr. Graham established the framework for the discussion by posing these questions: Howdo we recognize a N IAC? Are there d iffere nt types ofNlAC? How does
the United States decide whether a NIAC exists or not? Mr. Graham commented
that the law of armed conflict (LOAC) provides no definition of NlAC, nor does
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. It is not clear what level of
violence must exist and how protracted that violence needs to be for there to be a
N IAG States have been reluctant to recognize NLACs within their own borders for
fear of legitimizing belligerent groups. Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions does not aid in defining NIAC; Additional Protocol II (AP II) narrows the number ofNLACs to which it would apply. The U.S. practice would appear to be that of making no official determination as to whether a NIAC exists,
but, instead, to state that all U.S. personnel involved in a conflict will comply with
LOAC, regardless of how such a conflict might be characterized. While perhaps
self-selVing, this is a practical ap proach with a proven track record.
xix
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Professor Corn focused on the issue of willful blindness in conflict determination and why this is a dangerous approach. When States invoke powers under
LOAC-namely, to kill and detain-then States should be estopped from neglecting to provide protections under Common Article 3. Said differently, if a State is
going to use the tools of war, then it m ust be bound by the rules of war. When a
State enters an armed conflict, it cannot label it as a NlAC or lAC to game the system.
Turning to the U.S. conflict against al Qaeda, Professor Corn believes the Bush administration attempted to use a gap in the law to justify an exception to Common
Article 3. The United States attempted to use the inherent right of self-defense to
justify the use of force, but pretended to not need to address jus in bello considerations. There was willful blindness to suggest that when invoking self-defense, the
question of the legal framework governing the conflict did not have to be
addressed.
Professor Garraway spoke from the European standpoint, and addressed the
border between law enforcement and NIAG Prior to 1949, there was either war or
peace. In 1949, everything changed, and the spectrum of violence over the last fifty
to sixty years has been like a rainbow, with difficulty in determining where the colors merge. The main issue for many years was the line between NIAC and lAC, but
the underlying problem is determining the line between law enforcement and
NIAG Human rights law and LOAC are reasonably compatible insofar as "prohibitions" are concerned. The problem comes with the "permissions" inherent in
"Hague law" on the conduct of hostilities. The challenge is that ifhuman rights law
and LOAC are not to collide, there need to be compromises where they differ, such
as in targeting. There is a need to know what law applies in which circumstances.
The answer might lie in the intensity of the violence. Where the intensity is similar
to lAC, LOAC has priority; where the level is less, human rights law has priority.
Mr. Chang observed that people are troubled by a dearth oflaw pertaining to
NIAG He argued that attempts to fill this perceived void by drawing from human
rights law or from law relating to lAC were unpersuasive and often an exercise in
applying law to situations for which it was not intended. Instead, Mr. Chang proposed that the law of neutrality, which governs the relations between belligerents
and neutrals, gave principled limits on transnational NlACs. In lAC, we know
whom we are fighting and where we want to fight . But in transnational NIAC, the
fighting often takes place in neutral or non-belligerent States against citizens of
such States. The framework of neutrality law is needed to detennine when persons
have forfeited their neutral immunity and acquired enemy status. Similarly, neutrality law is needed to determine where the State may use force, i.e., when other
States are unable or unwilling to address threats emanating from their territories.
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Panel II: Legal Status of Actors in NlAC
The International Law Department's Commander Andrew Norris, U.S. Coast
Guard, moderated this panel, which consisted of Durham University professor
Michael Schmitt, Creighton University School of Law professor Sean Watts and
Mr. Stephen Pomper of the U.s. Department of State. The panel delved into the legal
status of actors in NIAC, focusing on the categorization of those fighting for and
against the State. Me. Pomper commented on various U.S. legal policy positions regarding NIAC.
Professor Schmitt discussed the law pertaining to opposition forces in NIAC,
noting that treaty law directly on point is sparse. A threshold issue is determining
whether the persons are actually members of the opposition or mere1y individual
criminals or members of criminal gangs taking advantage of the instability that exists during conflict. The latter cannot be parties to the conflict unless they are acting in support of rebel forces, and operations conducted against them are governed
by domestic and human rights law. Professor Schmitt cautioned, however, that
there is a possible change in the wind for well-organized anned criminal gangs
competing with the State for control and authority over territory when the State
must resort to the military in response. As to opposition forces in a NlAC, the easiest case is that of dissident armed forces, which are dearly targetable at all times.
Other groups must display some level of structure and coordination and engage in
"armed" actions (or support thereot) against the State before attaining the status of
an "organized armed group," that is, a party to the conflict and therefore subject to
targeting as such. Individuals who act against the State without membership in an
organized armed group may qualify as "direct participants in hostilities" depending on the nature of their activities. When they qualify, they become targetable for
such time as they participate in the conflict. Professor Schmitt argued that if they
engage in recurring acts of hostility, their targetability extends throughout the
period of the acts.
Professor Watts addressed the status of government forces in NIAC, and clarified that "status" was being discussed in the classic sense as combatant status, i.e.,
one's exposure to hostilities and one's authority to engage in hostilities. Initially,
Professor Watts observed that States have not turned to international law to define
the status of government forces in NlAC. There is no customary international law
in this area and very little by way of treatment in scholarly journals. States have not
seen a need for international law to speak to the issue of government forces in
NlAC, because they are committed to domestic law in this area and have generally
been reluctant to commit NIAC issues to international law. Additionally, there is a
lack of consensus among States as to the law applicable to NlAC. However, NIAC
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law is changing. It is possible to imagine a future where some States-and perhaps
tribunals-recognize rules regulating participation of government forces in NIAC
Although NIAC rules are often developed by analogy from rules of lAC, the more
likely source fo r such a rule would be some derivation of the existing NlAC rule of
distinction. Professor Watts suggested, however, that such a rule would be ineffective in addressing the traditional concerns of distinction. The real concern with
government forces' participation in NIAC is their conduct rather than their legal
status. Ultimately, this exercise requires a choice between conceiving of combatant
status as a gateway to protections and obligations and conceiving of status in purely
political tenns. This forces a more theoretical consideration of jus in bello than
usual.
Mr. Pomper noted that the rules governing actors in NlAC are less developed
than in lAC Often NIAC rules are drawn from their analogs in lAC and translated
into the NlAC context, but this exercise can be difficult. There are identity and status issues at the center of this exercise. Parallels exist between NlAC and lAC, but it
is difficult to categorize the actors in NlAC the same way we do in lAC How this is
defined has important implications for life and liberty, and has great operational
significance for warfighters. There appears to be growing consensus among the
United States and like-minded countries that there are two primary ways an individual becomes liable to attack in a NIAC The first is ifhe is a member of an organized armed group; the second is if he is a civilian who directly participates in
hostilities, whether or not a member of an organized armed group. An individual
who is a member of an organized armed group can be attacked at any time. By
contrast, a civilian who directly participates in hostilities loses protection only for
the duration of the participation. There also appears to be growing support for the
concept that to detennine whether there is direct participation in hostilities, the
nature of the harm, causation and a nexus to the hostilities must be considered.

Panel III: Means and Methods in NIAC
Lieutenant Colonel George Cadwalader Jr., U.S. Marine Corps, of the International Law Department, moderated this panel, which discussed means and methods in NlAC The panel consisted of Air Commodore Bill Boothby of the Royal Air
Force, Professor Dr. Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg of Europa-Universitat
Viadrinaand Mr. Dick Jackson, the Special Assistant to the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General for Law of War Matters.
Air Commodore Boothby opened the panel by posing the question whether
there is a meaningful distinction between the weapons laws that apply during lAC
and NlAC First examining the similarities, he noted that the fundamental
xxii
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principles of superlluous injury/ unnecessary suffering and the prohibition of
weapons that are indiscriminate by nature apply equally in both types of conflict.
AP II applies to both, as d o the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological
Weapons Convention, the Ottawa Convention and the Cluster Munitions Convention. However, there is an issue raised by expanding bullets. While treaty law
bans the use of expanding bullets in lAC, it is q uestionable whether this is customaryinternationallaw. The Kampala Review Conference for the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court (ICC) added the offense of employing expanding
bullets to those that could be committed in NIAC, but only if they are employed to
" uselessly aggravate suffering." Thus, expanding bullets seem to represent a point
of distinction between the laws applicable to lAC and N IAC. In the former, the offense is no t tied to superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering; in the latter it is.
While the general trend has been convergence in the weapons laws of these two
classes of conilict, achieving complete convergence would require State action and
adjustment of some legal interpretations.
Professor Dr. Heintschel von Heinegg focused on naval means of warfare in
N IAC. Until the 19905 there were not many rules in NIAC related to m eans and
methods. The emerging trend is to expand treaty law applicable to NIAC through
the terms of the treaty itself, i.e., the treaty provisions state that it applies in NlACs.
However, those treaties that do not distinguish between lACs and NlACs have not
becom e customary international law. If there is a merger between the law in lAC
and that in NlAC, then it can not be a one-way street. The law cannot just speak
about protections, but must also address privileges, such as targeting. There have
been some historical examples of naval components to NlACs, such as during the
Spanish Civil War, and the Sri Lanka, Algerian and, more recently, Libyan conIlicts. There are no substantive rules of international law prohibiting naval means
and methods in N IAC. Within the State's territory, government forces can interfere with international navigatio n. However, government forces cannot expand
this principle to international waters. And, if non-State actors interfere with navigation, the State must provide notice to international shipping.
Me. Jackson remarked that the trend has been a collapsing of lAC rules into
NIAC, driven largely by the warfighter on the ground who does not know when the
situation shifts from an lAC toa NIAC. He then discussed perfidy in NIAC. Perfidy
violates the principle of distinction. The most important part of perfidy under
N IAC is feigning of civilian status. The M ilitary Commissions Act requires a showing of a violation of LOAC; perfidy may be charged as such a violation.
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Panel IV: Recent and Ongoing NIACs
This panel, moderated by NavaJ War College professor Pete Pedrozo, was comprised
of Lieutenant General Raymundo Ferrer of the Philippine Armed Forces, Colonel
Juan Carlos Gomez of the Colombian Air Force and Captain Rob McLaughlin of the
Royal Australian Navy. Its focus was on recent and ongoing NlACs.
General Ferrer foc used on the two major insurgent groups in the Philippines:
the Maoist group and the Moro group. The Maoist group, consisting of the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army, operates nationwide and is
the longest-running Maoist insurgency in the world. The Moro group operates
primarily in the southern Philippines, and consists of three major groups: the
Moro National Liberation Front, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Abu
Sayyaf Group. General Ferrer opined that the NlAC in the Philippines is a cry for
human security.
Colonel Gomez discussed the forty-five years of internal conflict in Colombia.
He stated there are three groups of illegal armed actors: the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Columbia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN) and paramilitary forces that have become criminal gangs. Colonel Gomez described the difficulty in the new operational environment that consists of human rights law on one
side and international humanitarian law on the other, with the government's effort
to combat terrorism and organized crime operating, depending on the circumstances, under one or the other of these tw"o norms. Essentially, human rights law
provides the framework in territory controlled by the government and international humanitarian law applies where the organized armed groups control. The
dichotomy is that under human rights law, where there is typical criminal violence,
the use of force is governed by restrained law enforcement standards, including
self-defense. Under international humanitarian law, where there is a high level of
violence, the concepts of military necessity, military objective, distinction, humanity and proportionality apply. The nature and location of the operation determine
whether government forces are operating under law enforcement-type rwes of engagement (ROE) or the more robust ROE applicable to traditional military
operations.
Captain Mclaughlin analyzed Australia's experience in East Timor, which he
described as a high-end law enforcement operation, and contrasted it with the
Australian experience in Afghanistan, which was a NIAC. He stated that whether a
conflict is classified as law enforcement, a NlAC or an lAC is important because
under a law enforcement scenario, lethal force can be used for self-defense, but in
NIAC and lAC, the LOAC principles govern the use of force. He opined that Afghanistan has clearly been a NIAC since 2005 and that there was little political or
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strategic risk in classifying it as such, especially since the Taliban are seen to have
few redeeming features. However, East Timor was, for political and strategic reasons as much as legal reasons, classified as a law enforcement action, in large part
because the intervening force was invited in by Indonesia and shared responsibility
for security with Indonesia. The decision on how to characterize a conflict impacts
ROE, determining whether there are attack or only self-defense ROE in place with
respect to lethal force. While self- defense ROE are the same under both labels, mission accomplishment ROE are where they differ. He indicated that there is little
practical difference between NIAC and law enforcement insofar as detention rwes
are concerned.

Luncheon Address
The Honorable Harold Koh, Legal Adviser of the Department of State, presented a
luncheon address entitled "International Law and Armed Conflict in the Obama
Administration." Mr. Koh opined that there was an emerging ObamalClinton
doctrine that espoused four principles: (1) principled engagement, (2) diplomacy
as an element of smart power, (3 ) strategic multilateralism and (4) compliance
with the rules of domestic and international law.
Mr. Koh stated that the United States is deeply committed to applying all applicable law, including LOAC, in its non-international armed con flict with al
Qaeda with respect to both targeting and detention. Under domestic law, the authority to detain stems from the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF),
as informed by the laws of war. Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II to
the Geneva Conventions, as well as the Supreme Court of the United States, all
contemplate that parties may lawfully detain belligerents to prevent them from
returning to the battlefield. Once detained, all persons in U.S. custody must be
treated humanely, and the administration has taken a number of steps to ensure
that detainees in U.S. custody are treated humanely in accordance with our domestic and international legal obligations. The United States has unequivocally affirmed that it will not engage in torture and has affirmed that current U.S. military
practices are consistent with Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions
and with Article 75 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, including
the rules within these instruments that parallel the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights.
He further stated that the United States complies with all applicable law in its
targeting practices. The United States is in an armed conflict with al Qaeda, the
Taliban and associated forces, and may also use force consistent with the inherent
right of self- defense. Congress has authorized force through the AUMF. Osama
xxv
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bin Laden, the leader of al Qaeda, clearly had an ongoing operational role and his
activities posed an imminent threat against the United States. There can be no
question that he was the leader of an enemy force and a legitimate target in our
armed conflict with al Qaeda. Moreover, the operation against him was conducted
in a manner consistent with LOAC, including with the principles of distinction
and proportionality, and in accordance with U.S. domestic law.
Turning to Libya, Mr. Koh stated that there was a call to international action by
the Arab League and NATO, and the use of force to protect civilians was authorized
by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter because the situation within Libya threatened international peace and security. US. actions were
consistent with the War Powers Resolution in these particular circumstances, specifically as follows: (1) the U.S. mission was limited in nature, duration and
scope-with the shift to an explicit support role by the U.S. forces as part of a
NATO-led multilateral civilian protection operation; (2) the exposure of U.S.
forces was limited, involving no U.S. casualties or threat of significant U.S. casualties and no sustained fighting or active exchanges of fire with hostile forces; (3) the
risk of escalation was limited, with no U.S. military forces on the ground; and (4)
the military means used were limited, the ordnance dropped being a fraction of
that used in Kosovo. Mr. Koh posed the question: Did Congress in 1973, when it
enacted the War Powers Resolution asan attempt to prevent future Vietnam Wars,
intend that it also interrupt a mission-limited in nature, duration and scope-launched to stop the slaughter of innocent civilians, as was the mission in Libya?
Mr. Koh concluded by remarking that the administration has tried to square its
emerging national security policies with the need for interoperability with allies
and coalition partners who are parties to the ICC and duster munitions and landmines treaties.

Panel V: Detention in NIAC
This panel was moderated by Lieutenant Colonel Eric Young, JA, U.S. Army, of
the International Law Department, and consisted of Brigadier General Thomas
Ayres, JA, U.S. Army, Lieutenant Commander Kovit Talasophon of the Royal Thai
Navy; Dr. Knut Dormann, of the International Committee of the Red Cross; and
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense; Rule of Law and Detainee Policy, William
Lietzau.
General Ayres addressed the role of detainee operations in NIAC. He noted that
legal authority existed to detain insurgents in a NIAC to keep them out of the fight
until the cessation of hostilities. He noted, however, that based upon his experiences in Iraq, there are four types of insurgents: (1) those acting for a criminal
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purpose, e.g., to steal; (2) those who oppose the presence of coalition forces and
attempt to demonstrate to the civilian populace that the occupying force is incapable of keeping civilians safe; (3) those who oppose the government and seek to discredit it; and (4) foreign fighters who may be training to engage in terrorist activities
and pose a threat to the national security interest of the United States or other coalition nations.
The first type of insurgent, those with a criminal purpose, would, in almost
all phases of the conflict, be turned over to the government of Iraq to be tried in
the domestic criminal courts. With regard to the remaining categories of insurgents, the coalition forces' objective was to detain only the worst of the worst, because, for operational reasons and due to "insurgent math," it was impossible to
detain all potential "bad actors." The operational realities drove the coalition to
evidence-based detention. Moreover, once the UN Security Council resolution
providing authority for the presence of coalition forces in Iraq neared expiration,
the coalition began transferring detainees to the Iraqi government. In preparation
for that transfer, the coalition sought to assist in the maturation of the Iraqi government institutions in their implementation of the rule of law by increasingly
complying with Iraqi law and respecting Iraq's criminal law as the basis for detaining insurgents. General Ayres asserted that the coalition's efforts in modeling
adherence to a criminal law paradigm to detain insurgents should not be seen as
undercutting the international humanitarian law basis for detaining insurgents in
a NIAC.
Lieutenant Commander Talasophon reviewed Thailand's experience with detention in what he characterized as "almost a civil war" with communist groups
during the Cold War and in border wars with its neighbors. He indicated that there
are ongoing hostilities in the southern portions of Thailand between the government and those with political grievances. However, the Thai government has declared that these hostilities are not a NIAC; therefore, they are dealt with through
law enforcement operations. Domestic law has been used instead of international
humanitarian law, although the government has complied with the spirit of Common Article 3 in conducting the operations. Detention is used to secure evidence
and to ensure that the actor does not engage in furth er violence.
Dr. Dormann spoke on the legal framework of detention in NlAC. He began
with a general obsenration that the sources of international law pertaining to detention in NlAC consisted of Common Article 3, Articles 4 through 6 of AP II and
customary international law. Next, he opined that it is now generally accepted that
human rights law applies alongside international humanitarian law in situations of
armed conflict, including, despite the view of some important dissenters like the
United States, extraterritorially. Dr. Dormann discussed the rules on treatment in
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detention, conditions of detention and fair trial rights, but focused his remarks on
internment (Le., non -cr iminal detention). He indicated that internment cannot be
used solely for interrogation purposes; nor can it be used as punishment for past
acts. Internment may be resorted to if there are imperative reasons fo r security to
do so, a standard which includes direct participation in hostilities. He stated that
the status of those detained should be periodically reviewed to determine whether
they are still a security threat. Dr. Dormann concluded by stating that there were
gaps in the law of detention in NlAC and States should meet to discuss the legal
framework to fill those gaps.
Me. Lietzau obselVed that the United States used to not think about what law
applied in NIAC, particularly with regard to those detained during the conflict. In
fact, the United States' last experience with long-term detention was of prisoners of
war captured during World War II. The law then was c1ear----enemy prisoners of
war could be held until the end of the conflict. But twenty-first-century conflicts
have changed. Now the war is not with another State, but with a non-State actor, al
Qaeda. In the early period of this new type of war, the United States was accused of
holding detainees indefinitely without providing a means of review to determine
whether there was sufficient basis for the detention. Today, newly captured individuals are submitted to a Detainee Review Board. The Board, comprised of three
field-grade military officers, reviews each individual's detention for both legality
and necessity of continued detention. The detainee receives expert assistance from
a U.S. officer who is authorized access to all reasonably available information pertaining to that detainee. This review is repeated periodically after the initial hearing, which must take place within sixty days of arrival at the internment facility.
Now some argue that the pendulum has swung too far, and that the United States is
releasing detainees (some of whom have returned to the fight) too quickly. What is
unarguable is that an indefinite detention without some form of process in these
new wars will not be stomached.

Panel VI: Enforcement in N IAC
Panel VI, on enforcement in NIAC, was moderated by Colonel Darren Stewart,
OBE, British Army, the Director of the Military Department of the International
Institute of Humanitarian Law at San Remo, Italy. The panelists were Professor
John Cerone, professor oflaw and Director, Center for International Law & Policy,
New England Law I Boston; University of Essex professor F ran~oise Hampson; and
Johns Hopkins University professor Ruth Wedgwood.
Introducing the topic, Colonel Stewart remarked that there is little substantive
black letter law applicable to NIAC when compared to the international
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humanitarian law applicable to lAC. However, while the law in NlAC has gaps, it is
applied day to day by practitioners on the ground. The question of enforcement
brings the gaps in the law into sharp focus.
Professor Cerone discussed enforcement issues in the context of the then-current
situation in Libya. After reviewing the phases of the conflj ct, he discussed the legal
regimes that applied to each phase, as well as how they related to each other. He
stated that it is now widely accepted that international human rights law applies
simultaneously with humanitarian law in internal armed confljcts. Even those
States that object to simultaneous application in international or transnational
armed conflicts do not object to the application of international human rights
law in internal anned conflicts. He then focused on international criminal law and
the Security Council referral of the situation in Libya to the ICC. As Libya is not a
party to the ICC Statute, the Court will need to address issues of immunity and
rlUllul11 crimen sine lege. The Court will have to ensure, in particular, that any
crimes prosecuted are well established in customary international law. Professor
Cerone indicated that twenty years ago it was debatable whether any violations of
NIAC law gave rise to individual criminal responsibility in international law. The
legal landscape has changed dramatically since that time. Nonetheless, he concluded that it is clear that not all of the war crimes within the subject matter jurisdiction of the ICC have entered the corpus of customary law.
Professor Hampson opined that in the past fifteen years the focus has been on
criminal responsibility, with not enough focus on civil responsibility. The advantages of a civil action are that the claim can be brought against a State without the
need to identify the actual perpetrators, there is a lower standard of proof than in
criminal cases and the victims have more control over the claims. Claims can be
brought in the domestic courts of the State where the violation occurred and possibly in the domestic courts of third-party States. Professor Hampson indicated that
there is no international means of bringing a claim against a non-State actor, although possibly arbitration could be used on an ad hoc basis. At the international
level, the only way to proceed is to bring a claim against a State. Claims could be
brought before the International Court of Justice or other human rights bodies. In
fact, she stated, the most important feature of the human rights bodies is the right
of an individual to me a petition with them.
Professor Wedgwood offered several suggestions for improving the work of the
ad hoc war crimes tribunals. First, indictments should be structured to allow a
speedy triaL The charges against Milosevic might have been tried in separate parts
in Bosnia, Croatia and Kosovo, instead of the four-year trial in the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICfY) during which both the presiding judge and the defendant passed away. Second, international justice should
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not be segregated bytribuna1; she obselVed that it is unfortunate the ICfY declined
to share evidence from Serb military archives with the International Court of Justice in the latter's adjudication of the Srebrenica genocide case. Third, it is important that cases be tried against defendants from all ethnic communities in a civil
conflict, so that there is no misplaced imputation of bias. The failure of the Rwanda
tribunal to try any cases against members of the Rwandan Patriotic Front and the
Tutsi armed forces , instead remitting them to local justice authorities controlled by
the Kagame government, was an unfortunate event. Fourth, political organs are
not well suited as the locus for war crimes investigations. In particular, the conducting of investigations of war crime allegations by the UN Secretary-General's
office or the H uman Rights Council may be problematic because oflimited factfinding capacity and their daily immersion in politics.
Closing Address

Professor Emeritus Yoram Dinstein of Tel Aviv University and the U.S. Naval War
College's Stockton Professor of International Law during academic years 19992000 and 2002-3 delivered the dosing address. Professor Dinstein addressed five
main areas: the definition of NlAC, thresholds in armed conflicts, jus in bello, intervention and interaction .
Professor Dinstein defined a NlAC as a conflict taking place within the borders
of a single State, carried out between the central government of that State and organized armed groups, or, there being no effective government , between organized
armed groups fighting each other. A NlAC can spill over across the borders and
start another NIAC in a second country, as happened in the Great Lakes region of
Africa. Still, the idea (endorsed by the Supreme Court of the United States) that a
NIAC can be global is oxymoronic.
Next, Professor Dinstein pointed out that there were three thresholds in armed
conflicts: two for NlACs and one for lAC, plus a sublevel of sporadic and isolated
violence (e.g., riots) that is below the first threshold, and thus law enforcement in
nature. The first threshold ofNlACs is established by Common Article 3 of the four
Geneva Conventions of 1949. This famous provision (which reflects customary international law) does not spell out what conditions have to be met for the first
threshold to be crossed. The Appeals Chamber of the lcrY, in the 1995 Tadic case
added the element that the violence must be "protracted."
The second threshold of NIACs is set up by AP II of 1977, which requires the
exercise of control by an organized armed group over a part of the territory, enabling it to carry out sustained and concerted military operations. Professor
Dinstein indicated that this requirement makes the distinction between a NlAC
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and forms of conflict not amounting to a NIAC much dearer: sustained and concerted military operations are the antonym of sporadic and isolated violence. The
acid test of control of some territory explains the difference, for instance, between
the then-current internal situations in Libya and Syria. In Libya (not counting the
foreign intervention by fiat of the Security Council), there was no doubt a NlAC
inasmuch as the insurgents exercised control over vast tracts ofland. By contrast,
the violence in Syria remained below the threshold- notwithstanding its great
intensity and the fact that it was protracted-because no part of the territory was
under the control of any insurgent organized armed group.
The third threshold means that the armed confli ct amounts to an lAC, and this
denotes that two or more States are pitted against each other.
Professor Dinstein then focused on the jus i" bello in NlAC, noting that while
there is a very remarkable trend in treaty law of growing convergence between the
jus in bello applicable in lACs and that in NlAC, there cannot be a full merger of the
law in the two types of armed conflict. He indicated that there are at least three insurmountable obstacles to such merger: (a) the domestic law will always consider
insurgents to be traitors and therefore they cannot be accorded the status of prisoners of war by the government of the State (absent recognition of belligerency); (b)
neutrality is not an issue, as there is only one State embroiled in a NlAC; and (c) the
whole body of law relating to belligerent occupation is irrelevant to NlACs since
neither the government nor the insurgents can be in belligerent occupation of their
own land. There are additional, less compelling problems relating to the legality of
certain means and methods of warfare, e.g., the legality of particular weapons and
blockades.
The issue of intervention relates to military assistance requested from , or offered by, a foreign country when a NIAC is going on. International law permits foreign countries to extend military assistance to the State combating insurgents. If
and when the foreign country does so, the armed conflict remains a NlAC, despite
the participation of foreign troops in the hostilities, inasmuch as the fo reign troops
are not battling another State. However, if the foreign troops are deployed against
the government, the armed conflict automatically crosses the third threshold and
becomes an lAC. Moreover, even when the foreign troops arrive at the request of
the government, consent to their presence can be withdrawn at any time. Once
consent is withdrawn by the government, the foreign fo rces must leave. Failure to
do so will result in the situation becoming an lAC.
The last issue Professor Dinstein addressed is interaction. He first indicated that
it must be appreciated that an armed conflict can coexist with the law enforcement
paradigm. Criminal activities do not cease when an armed conflict (either a NIAC
or an lAC) breaks out. Indeed, usually crime rises in wartime, if only because there
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are numerous new crimes (such as black market activities or trading with the enemy). Ordinary crimes, even in the course of an armed conflict. are governed not
by the jus in bello b ut by domestic criminal law, subject to the precepts of intern ational human rights. Second. a NlAC can segue into an lAC; foreign intervention
on behalf of insurgents is a prime example. But an lAC can also be the outcome of
the implosion of a State torn apart by a NlAC and the continuation of the hostilities
between several new sovereign States created on its ruins. Obviously. as far as fighters in the field are concerned. it may not always be easy to detect at what exact point
a NlAC has morphed into an lAC (the situation in Bosnia in 1992 showed that lack
of clarity in a graphic manner). It is therefore easier to analyze the situation when
there has been an intervening period of time; for instance, Eritrea first rebelled successfully against Ethiopia in a NIAC. and then. several years later, started an lAC
against the same country. Third, the reverse is also true: lACs can turn into NIACs.
Thus, the lAC between the American-led coalition and the Baathist regime in Iraq
came to a successful end, and the fighting that continues in Iraq is today no more
than a NlAC. Fourth. a NIAC and an lAC can be waged concurrently in the same
country. The best illustration is Afghanistan in 2001, where there was a NlAC between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance. and (starting in October of that year)
a separate lAC between the United States (supported by its allies) and the Taliban.
Fifth, as indicated by General Ferrer with respect to the Philippines. there may even
be several unrelated NlACs going on in the same country simultaneously, where
different organized armed groups fight the same central government while having
diverse-and perhaps clashing-aims. All this can cause confusion. especially
since governments are often "in denial," reversing the thresholds. That is to say.
when governments are engaged in an lAC. they tend to claim that the armed conflict is no more than a NIAC. When they are caught in a NlAC, they are inclined to
maintain that the violence is sporadic and below the NIAC threshold.
Professor Dinstein concluded by recognizing that times are changing and that
NlAC law must change with them.
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